An Italian parliamentary committee has confirmed that the country’s intelligence services used spyware developed by Israeli company Paragon to monitor immigration activists. However, the committee denied that a well-known journalist was among those targeted—leaving several troubling questions unresolved.
The investigation was carried out by COPASIR, Italy’s parliamentary oversight committee for national security. Their report, published this week, followed months of scrutiny after WhatsApp sent warnings to around 90 users in January, alerting them to potential spyware attacks involving Paragon’s tool known as Graphite.
Among those investigated were Luca Casarini and Giuseppe Caccia, members of Mediterranea Saving Humans, a nonprofit that rescues migrants attempting dangerous sea crossings. COPASIR concluded that the surveillance of both individuals was legally sanctioned, as they were under investigation for allegedly facilitating illegal immigration.
The report also examined the case of Francesco Cancellato, the director of Italian news outlet Fanpage.it, who also received a WhatsApp warning. COPASIR found no evidence that Italian intelligence had targeted him, stating that neither surveillance logs nor legal authorizations were found to support such claims. However, the report left open the possibility that a foreign government could have been behind the attack, offering no concrete proof.
Cancellato, whose outlet has published critical investigations into Italy’s far-right political movements, expressed doubt about the committee’s conclusions, writing that more clarity is needed. Another journalist, Ciro Pellegrino, was also notified—this time by Apple—about spyware activity on his phone, but his case was not addressed in the report.
The committee’s findings also uncovered details about how Graphite works. Each deployment requires operator authentication and leaves tamper-proof logs stored on servers controlled by the customer agency, not Paragon. The spyware was used by Italy’s domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, AISI and AISE, under contracts that have since been canceled.
Both agencies stated that Graphite was used in a limited number of operations focused on national security, such as terrorism and organized crime, with judicial oversight in each case. The contracts reportedly contained explicit restrictions against targeting journalists and human rights defenders.
Despite these assurances, critics remain uneasy. With international concerns around spyware abuse growing, questions about foreign involvement and the broader implications for press freedom in Italy remain unanswered.
